German High Seas Fleet 1914–18 - The Kaiser’s challenge to the Royal Navy

The German High Seas Fleet was a ‘luxury’, an ‘extravagance’ which lacked a proper purpose when war was declared in August 1914. Thus claims author Angus Konstam in his book about the origins of the High Seas Fleet and its clashes with the mighty Royal Navy during World War I. The adversaries stood in marked contrast to one another: the British could call upon centuries of experience and an illustrious history. In contrast the Hochseeflotte was the impudent upstart. It was only in 1892 that Alfred von Tirpitz had drawn up a bold, strategic plan for the Navy which he hoped would gain the approval of the Kaiser. Just twenty years later, with vast sums of money spent in the meantime, the so-called ‘dreadnought race’ had reached its zenith. This book is the second title in an attractive new series by Osprey Publishing. The eighty pages carry many photographs and some atmospheric artwork by Edouard Goult while the narrative is interspersed with helpful diagrams showing key moments in various engagements and inserts providing further detailed information covering important aspects of strategy and tactics. The four chapters include firstly a strategic overview, then a technical description of the German fleets themselves, thirdly analyses of different aspects of the operational structure and lastly descriptions of the major surface engagements, including the Battle of Jutland in 1916. The increasing potency of the U-Boat threat is acknowledged, of course, but understandably this subject does not receive prominence as it is aside from the principal thrust of the narrative. Tirpitz devised a ‘risk theory’ based on the premise that if Germany possessed a modern, powerful fleet, although it would probably lose a decisive battle with the Royal Navy, the latter’s losses would result in its power being fatally weakened. Konstam explains why Tirpitz’s reasoning was fatally flawed however, and Germany by the end of the war was forced to accept the undesirable role of a mere ‘fleet in being’. The strategic plan was handicapped by the Kaiser himself whose position as commander-in-chief of the Navy meant that he was the ultimate decision-maker. Wilhelm II was not only determinedly ‘hands-on’ but also risk-averse which only served to inhibit his fleet commanders. It is nothing short of amazing, nevertheless, that within a few short years, the German Hochseeflotte was technologically equal, if not superior, to the British Grand Fleet in several respects. This was to be vividly illustrated during battles such as Jutland where the RN suffered catastrophic losses caused by design flaws while their opponent’s ships proved remarkably durable in the face of prolonged shell-fire. Osprey are to be congratulated for producing a fine introduction to this subject which is certain to lead an interested reader to seek further, more in-depth studies of aspects of this famous period of naval history. Angus Konstam adopts a very balanced, objective approach and has produced a concise and accessible account of the remarkably short-lived rise and fall of the Kaiser’s Navy.