Abandon Ship - The Real Story of the Sinkings in the Falklands War

A difficult read in so much that it brings home the bare facts of the significant ship loses of the war. For those with a naval background the detail and descriptions within each ships account will resonate with personal experiences. It was found most loses could have been avoided or very much reduced had proper training and leadership been followed, however no war is ever fought perfectly and this publication gives a nod towards the fog of war and the realities that were not covered in pre Falkland training regimes. I would recommend this book for all budding naval officers as much as any Falkland historian or commentator. I very well researched and presented book, highly recommended.

This reviewer’s abiding memory of the Falklands War is of waking up on that early May morning to the news that HMS Sheffield was lying burning and abandoned in the waters of the South Atlantic having been struck by an air-launched Exocet missile. How could this have happened to one of our newest warships, an area defence anti-warfare destroyer to boot, armed with a state-of-the art Sea Dart missile system? More sinkings were to follow of course: the two Type 21 frigates Ardent and Antelope, HMS Coventry another Type 42, the STUFT aircraft ferry SS Atlantic Conveyer and then the LSL RFA Sir Galahad. Since that brief but bloody war there has been a plethora of books as historians, academics and, vitally, those with personal experience, have pored over all aspects of this unexpected conflict with an otherwise friendly nation. These range from general accounts of the campaign including an officially commissioned history to a range of studies and memoirs covering every angle of the air war, the land war, the major battles and the everyday happenings. Paul Brown concentrates almost exclusively on the circumstances surrounding the losses of the six RN ships plus the major Argentine casualty, the cruiser ARA General Belgrano, torpedoed and sunk in controversial circumstances by the nuclear submarine HMS Conqueror. A chapter is devoted to each of these events and follows an identical pattern. The movements leading up to the bombing or torpedoing of the ship is related, followed by a step by step account of what happened afterwards before the ship was abandoned and later sunk. The author then recounts the conclusions of the findings of the official boards of enquiry into the loss. There may well have been an equivalent investigation into the sinking of the General Belgrano by the Argentine Navy but if so Brown does not make reference to it. Unpreparedness, luck, ill-judgement, hasty decision-making, leadership, inexperience, fear, confusion and communications all played their part in these events. Added to the list of ‘human factors’ is the performance of the ‘hardware’ itself: the internal and external structure and resilience of the ships, their defensive and offensive armaments, their damage control arrangements, their electronic and communications equipment etc. The author points out, absolutely correctly, that this was the first time since World War II 37 years previously, that modern weapon systems employed by both sides, had been tested in war. He might have added that only the most senior officer in the Royal Navy, the First Sea Lord Admiral Sir Henry Leach, had combat experience during World War II. The vast majority of the men on both sides had never been put in a situation when their lives were actually put at risk. Abandon Ship additionally shows how people react in such circumstances and includes some breath-taking examples of selfless heroism in the face of extreme danger. For those who went south with the task force and those who watched events unfold from afar with often horrified fascination, this book makes for compelling reading.